


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9 APRIL 1992



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-92-013

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29 April 1992

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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Official Urges Expanded Use of Nuclear Power

*OW1904061092 Beijing XINHUA in English
0509 GMT 19 Apr 92*

[Text] Beijing, April 19 (XINHUA)—China is urged to use more nuclear power for civilian purpose at the turn of the next century, according to the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation.

Zhang Xinduo, president of the corporation, said, by then, China will have stronger national economic power and a well-established nuclear system and there will be vast potential markets for electricity.

Zhang, a fervent advocate of nuclear power, said wide use of nuclear power would ease the strain on the country's railroads, which currently are bound by the stifling demands of transporting the nation's coal.

He said nuclear makes up only a small part—one percent if Daya Bay nuclear power station goes into operation—of China's electricity generation capacity.

The Daya Bay power plant will comprise two 900-megawatt units with the first one expected to be on line next year.

So far, China has only one 300-megawatt unit at the Qinshan nuclear power station.

Zhang said China should provide favourable policies to the benefit of the industry and encourage foreign funds.

Third Nuclear Plant Planned

*HK1604074792 Hong Kong AFP in English 0348 GMT
16 April 92*

[Text] Hong Kong, April 16 (AFP)—China is to build its third nuclear power station at Yangjiang in the southern province of Guangdong, with French, U.S., British and Japanese firms competing for the contract, a weekly reported here Thursday.

Although the construction of the four billion U.S. dollar plant will not start for at least five years, the competition was already intense among these firms, the Hong Kong-based FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW said in its latest issue.

It said the site—in the far west of the province—was selected to avoid public opposition in the British colony, following the outcry in 1986 over news that China's first full-sized nuclear power plant would be located at Daya Bay, some 50 kilometers (33.5 miles) from Hong Kong.

The Daya Bay plant is expected to become operational next year.

Some 200 kilometers (134 miles) distant from Hong Kong, Yangjiang was also chosen to help spur development in Guangdong's relatively poor western region, it said.

Nuclear Fusion Tokamak Device Achieves Results

*OW2104110292 Beijing XINHUA in English
0955 GMT 21 Apr 92*

[Text] Chengdu, April 21 (XINHUA)—The Huanliu No. 1 Tokamak, China's biggest controlled nuclear fusion device, has successfully completed an experiment of transfer from low bondage to high bondage, which marks the experiment of the device up to the advanced world level.

Controlled nuclear fusion is one of the key research projects in the world. The success of the research project will find energy from sea water for mankind to use for billions of years. Compared to the existing nuclear power plants based on nuclear fission, controlled fusion is safer and cleaner.

The transfer from low bondage to high bondage has increased the plasma density. During the experiment in the Tokamak device, the plasma density has reached a thousand billion [one trillion] per cubic centimeter. The experiment has also achieved remarkable progress in the increase of the plasma temperature and bondage time. Plasma density, temperature and bondage are the three main factors for controlled fusion.

The southwest nuclear physics institute has also succeeded in carbonifying walls of the vacuum tube, which is a key technique for building nuclear fusion reactors in the future.

The successes have already attracted the attention of foreign nuclear scientists.

The Huanliu No. 1 Tokamak, which went into operation in 1984, will retire after making another round of experiments this year. The state plans to invest 18 million yuan in renovating the Tokamak device, which will go into operation in 1994.

First Thermal Power Station Simulator Created

*OW1604025292 Beijing XINHUA in English
0103 GMT 16 Apr 92*

[Text] Shijiazhuang, April 16 (XINHUA)—A power research unit in Shijiazhuang, capital of north China's Hebei Province, has recently worked out the country's first thermal power station simulating system.

The simulator, a hi-tech product made by the Simulation and Control Technology Institute of the North China Power College, can accurately simulate the process of a thermal power station and is very useful for training technicians for thermal power stations.

The college started research in this field in the mid-1970s, and in 1991 the Star-90 simulating system was successfully used in the Ningxia Daba thermal power station to train the station's operators.

JAPAN

Tokyo Assumes Plutonium Shipment Responsibility

OW2004103492 Tokyo KYODO in English 0952 GMT 20 Apr 92

[Text] Tokyo, April 20 KYODO—Japan will assume "100 percent" responsibility for the safety of plutonium to be shipped from France later this year, the head of Japan's Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp. (PNC) said Monday.

Takao Ishiwatari said at a press conference that few concerns were voiced when Japan first shipped 180 kilograms of plutonium from France in 1984.

"Times have changed," Ishiwatari said. "When we carried the 180 kilograms a few years ago, the United States informally and unofficially took care of the transport in a very benign way."

"This time, there will be no specific assistance or help," he said. "In other words, Japan will be 100 percent responsible for the transport. But we will get information from U.S. satellites."

Japan will use an armed patrol ship to provide security for plutonium reprocessed in Britain and France from spent nuclear fuel used in Japanese nuclear power plants.

Ishiwatari refused to divulge when the first transfer will be made, although it is expected to occur later this year.

"We are confident we can do it safely and securely," he said. "I am keeping my fingers crossed so a meteor will not hit the ship."

Ishiwatari said the corporation in February successfully tested to a depth equivalent to 10,000 meters the canisters it intends to use. He said the tests, conducted out of "scientific curiosity," were designed to meet Transport Ministry standards more stringent than those set by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Ishiwatari said Japan consumes 600 kilograms of plutonium a year, but can produce only 400 kilograms. He said the plutonium from Europe will amount to "just under a ton."

Ishiwatari acknowledged the prospect that extra plutonium from warheads on dismantled nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union could eventually add to a world oversupply of plutonium. "But we do not know when the dismantling will take place and at what speed," he said. "Therefore we are going ahead with the plan for transporting plutonium."

Ishiwatari said it is his "personal belief" that because of a possible oversupply of plutonium, Japan now needs to shift its emphasis from fast breeder reactors, which can produce more plutonium than they use, to fast reactors.

"There is plenty of plutonium in the world today," Ishiwatari said. "We do not have any urgent necessity to produce more."

"Japan shall not possess any excess plutonium and therefore there will be no chance—none whatsoever—that Japan will arm itself with nuclear weapons," he said.

Ishiwatari said nuclear energy now accounts for 16.4 percent of the world's electricity output. He said Japan's share of the world's nuclear power generation production is 16 percent, but added that it is expected to rise to more than 20 percent by 2000. Nuclear power in Japan accounts for 26.6 percent of the nation's electricity consumption.

NORTH KOREA

TV Report Examines Nuclear Power Industry

SK1504043192 Pyongyang Korean Central Television Network in Korean 1032 GMT 12 Apr 92

[Report: "Atomic Power Industrial Base Constructed Independently in Our Country"]

[Text] [Announcer] The nuclear industry is a domain with great significance, especially for the future, in satisfactorily resolving the daily increasing demand for energy according to the national economy's development.

The base of the chuche-type nuclear energy industry, which was built in our country under the wise leadership of the great leader and our party, is a foundation of nuclear energy that guarantees the development of the self-reliant national economy and is a brilliant creation inspiring great confidence.

Before we tour the nuclear research base and facilities in various units, which were built for the first time in our country, we had a brief interview with Comrade Yi Yong-ha, deputy director of the Bureau of Scientific Guidance, the Ministry of Nuclear Industry.

[Reporter] We would like to hear from you about the background of the base of the self-reliant nuclear industry and how it was realized in our country.

[Yi Yong-ha] As everyone knows, no one can imagine the development of modern industry without a reliable energy base. Foreseeing the distant future of the nation's economic development, the great leader formed a profound plan for developing nuclear energy and for using it as energy and saw to it that the scientific research work on this energy was carried out systematically.

At party congresses and various meetings, the great leader elucidated a clear guideline that emphasized that our nation's nuclear industry should be established only for peaceful purposes and be pushed forward and developed on the chuche-oriented principle and by focusing our efforts on resolving the energy problem.

Under the past conditions, in which there were no competent scientists or technicians in the atomic energy sector, we made the first start. However, we selected the steps for establishing the nuclear energy industry exactly under the wise leadership of the great leader and the party. We began the work of rearing scientists and technicians, as well as the work of establishing a research base. We pushed ahead with the exploration and development of mines to resolve the issue of nuclear raw materials by ourselves. We also implemented all issues, such as manufacturing uranium ore concentrate and nuclear fuel rods, selecting the type of nuclear reactor that corresponded to our realities, and designing and manufacturing such reactors, based on the *chuche* position and with our own strength.

As a result, we built as the first step a 5,000 kw test nuclear power station in the Yongbyon nuclear research base, and operated it by infusing the nuclear fuel that we made by ourselves. Thus, we are operating it safely.

When you tour the site, you will actually realize the vitality of our party's policy for founding a self-reliant nuclear industry base. I believe that you will also realize how great the might of our scientists, technicians, and the working class is.

[Announcer] Under the guidance of Comrade Hong Sung-ku, senior technician in the test nuclear power station, we toured the facilities in the power station. This power station is a 5,000 kw test nuclear power station completed in the early part of 1986 by scientists and technicians in the nuclear energy domain by depending on our self-reliant national economy.

According to Comrade Hong Sung-ku, the nuclear reactor in this power station is a natural uranium graphite deceleration and carbonic acid gas coolant-type nuclear reactor. He explained in detail that this reactor uses natural uranium, which is abundantly found in our country, as nuclear fuel, high-purity graphite as the deceleration element, and carbonic acid gas as its heat conductor. Thus, this nuclear reactor is the type corresponding to our nation's practical situation.

This is the central control room of the power station. This central control room oversees and monitors the overall technological status of the nuclear power station through various gauges and electronic calculators. This room operates and stops the nuclear reactor and watches scores of special and characteristic phenomena, including temperature, pressure, and the quantity of oil in the reactor. Thus, this room ensures normal operation with relevant power output.

This room has a protective measure to stop the nuclear reactor automatically in case any accident occurs in any part of the power station. The startup of the nuclear reactor and the course of maintaining and suspending normal power output are being controlled by a controller. The location of this controller is learned from this indicator.

This is a fuel changing instrument that was researched and designed by our scientists and technicians in the nuclear energy sector and was manufactured by the working class in Yongsong.

This machine, weighing 280 tons, carries out the work of removing damaged fuel rods or rods that have been used out of the nuclear reactor and for inserting new fuel rods, moving horizontally and vertically according to the set coordinates with a high degree of precision.

This is the system that checks the damaged fuel. This system regularly checks the condition of all the fuel rods in the nuclear reactor and automatically locates the damaged fuel rods. This turbine and generator, which the working class of the Taean Heavy Machinery Complex designed and manufactured, are the ones that produce the 5,000 kw of electricity.

These instruments check the degree of radioactive contamination. Because we have these protective systems that our scientists and technicians have researched, developed, manufactured, and installed, the personnel working in the nuclear power plant building are assured of safety from radioactive contamination.

While touring the processes and facilities of the nuclear power plant, we gratefully feel the high pride of having the *chuche*-educated intellectuals who have been brought up by the great leader and the dear comrade leader, our working class which is faithful to the party and the revolution, and the strong basis of self-reliant economy that have enabled the foundation of our nuclear energy industry today.

For a nuclear reactor to operate in a nuclear power plant, we must have nuclear fuel for it. This is the plant in the Yongbyon nuclear power research base producing nuclear fuel rods. This plant produces nuclear fuel rods from the uranium ore concentrate using chemical processes and metallurgic and mechanical processes. We interviewed Comrade Chong Chi-pu, chief engineer of this plant, on the nuclear fuel rod production processes.

[Chong Chi-pu] A self-reliant nuclear fuel industry is essential to the independent nature of the nuclear energy industry. One ton of natural uranium equals 20,000 tons of coal. There are many uranium mines in our country. In Pakchon district, we have a medium plant which produces uranium ore concentrate from the uranium ore excavated in Sunchon district. Then, based on the experience we have attained, we built a new uranium ore concentrate production base in Pyongsan district.

The ore concentrate plant built in Pyongsan district began its first-stage operation in the second half of 1990 following partial trial operations. We are producing nuclear fuel rods receiving all the uranium ore concentrate produced in the Pakchon and Pyongsan districts. As for the uranium production processes, high-grade uranium ore is selected from the ore that is excavated. After being powdered, acid is used as a solvent, and following the ion exchange and sedimentation process,

ore concentrate is produced. Our plant receives the ore concentrate thus produced and produces metal uranium following various processes, such as an acid treatment process, refining process, metallurgic process, and heat treatment process. Only after we cover the metal uranium with a shell and go through the completion process, can we obtain the nuclear fuel rods for burning in the nuclear reactor.

[Announcer] After listening to the nuclear fuel production processes, we knew that because our nuclear energy industry has a strong *chuche*-oriented fuel base, it is assured of a safe and rapid development.

We also visited various research institutes in the Atomic Energy Research Base, which was built in the Yongbyon area. In the research institutes there were various research laboratories that carry out various research projects, including those on atomic reactor physics, atomic reactor engineering, nuclear fuel, and nuclear materials, the automation systems of the atomic reactor, and nuclear electronic equipment. Our scientists and technicians were conducting research there.

In hearty response to our party's policy on building the *chuche*-oriented atomic energy industry, the scientists and technicians were skillfully solving scientific and technological problems concerning the nuclear power industry. They are the people in charge of our nuclear power industry, which has prospects for rapid progress. How trustworthy they are and how proud their achievements are!

We also visited the Pyongyang Atomic Energy Research Institute to know how atomic energy is being used in the power industry and other industries, as well, in our country.

Comrade Yi Kwang-yong, director of the Science Department of the Atomic Energy Research Institute, said:

[Yi Kwang-yong] Our Atomic Energy Research Institute is a research base that studies not only nuclear physics but also how to widely apply achievements from research in atomic energy to various fields of the people's economy. During his report to the Fourth Congress of the Workers Party of Korea, the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song taught that radioactive isotopes and radioactive rays [*pangsason*] must be widely used in industrial fields, the rural economy, and various other fields of the people's economy. In response to this teaching by the great leader, our research institute produces radioactive isotopes and sends them to various fields of the people's economy. A variety of fields are using radioactive isotopes. For example, the chemical industry, the metallurgical industry, the mining industry, and the agricultural field use them in analyzing ores, resources, and soil, studying properties of materials, and treating seeds. In this way, our country's atomic energy industry is widely used for peaceful purposes, in other words, in developing the people's economy and promoting the people's welfare. We will more positively conduct research to utilize

atomic energy in the people's economy, thus further contributing to developing the people's economy and promoting the people's welfare.

[Announcer] What we felt at all the atomic energy facilities and research bases that we visited was that our atomic energy industry is very self-reliant, that the research bases are strong, that a new generation of promising and reliable young scientists and technicians trained by our party are in charge, and that, as a result, prospects are very optimistic.

Truly, the construction of the first experimental atomic power station in our country is the proud result that our intellectuals and working class have brought about in creating the self-reliant nuclear power industry under the wise leadership of the great leader and the dear comrade leader. This also demonstrates the justness and vitality of our party's line and plan for building the *chuche*-oriented atomic energy industry.

Functionaries, scientists, technicians, and the working class at the nuclear energy industrial sector, with hearts filled with faith in victory and optimism, are vigorously accelerating the construction of a nuclear reactor with a high generating capacity. This is part of a plan to develop nuclear energy to meet the increasing demand for energy.

Ever since the test nuclear reactor was put into operation, a 50,000-kilowatt nuclear reactor for producing energy that we designed based on reactor engineering and thermal technology tests, tests on the safety of the control system, an examination of nuclear materials and equipment, and operational experience has been in an earnest stage of construction. It will be operating by the end of 1995.

They have also begun building another 200,000 kilowatt nuclear reactor of the same type for the generation of energy. It is expected to begin operating some time during 1996. Designing another reactor, far bigger than this in generating capacity, is under consideration.

When our party's *chuche*-oriented policy on building nuclear energy bases is completely implemented, nuclear energy bases using locally available fuels will be erected in various places. Based on this, our self-sufficient national economy will develop and demonstrate its might even more.

SOUTH KOREA

Russian Scientists Invited for Research, Jobs

922C0110A Seoul HANGUK ILBO in Korean
7 Feb 92 p 1

[Text] Moscow (YONHAP)—With the effectuation of the ROK-Russian science and technology agreement, the ROK Government has decided to invite Russian scientists of advanced levels en masse to research jobs in Korea, effective this year.

The ROK Embassy in Moscow disclosed on 6 February that it had reached tentative agreement with the Russian Government on employing 110 Russian scientists this year to work on a variety of research programs at Korean institutes.

Those research institutes began signing contracts with individual scientists in December last year and, as a result, three of them are already in the country doing with their research and 12 others have completed the signing of contracts. Altogether, approximately 110 are expected to be working at Korean institutes by the end of the year.

Their research activities in South Korea will be in those fields where the former Soviet Union was known for maintaining high levels—i.e., electronics, machinery, applied physics, material engineering, special fibers, and aeronautics. The period of employment ranges from six

months to one year, with the minimum being three months. They will be paid all their expenses in addition to the contracted compensations.

They will work at government-subsidized institutes including the Korea Institute of Machinery and Metals, the Institute of Aeronautics and Space, the Samsung Institute of Technology, and the Seoul National University research institutes.

At some 5,000 science and technology research institutes of the former Soviet Union, advanced-level scientists and engineers are facing threats of losing their jobs in the face of current reorganizations. As the drain of those scientists and engineers increases speed, Russian authorities are desperately trying to keep them, particularly those in advanced fields of high strategic values, such as nuclear science and space engineering, from leaving the country.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Nuclear Plant Explains Import of German Fuel

AU2104184592 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
15 Apr 92 p 3

[TR report: "More Fuel, No Waste; Dukovany-Bound 'Nuclear Train'"]

[Text] Dukovany—"It is true that five closed railroad cars from Germany have arrived in Dukovany. Their contents consisted of fresh fuel purchased from the decommissioned nuclear power station at Greifswald," Engineer F. Rerucha, head of the information center of the Dukovany nuclear power station, told RUDE PRAVO on Tuesday [14 April].

He was reacting to reports published by SEVERO-CESKY DENIK on 8 and 9 April about the arrival in Dukovany, via Decin, of a train with "nuclear waste" from Germany. Engineer Rerucha said that the Greifswald nuclear power station is going out of operation because of obsolescence of the VVER 230 reactors. This was an extraordinary purchase that was about 30 percent cheaper than the nuclear fuel that we otherwise import from Russia, he said. He also confirmed that only spent fuel from Dukovany will be deposited in the planned temporary storage depot on the nuclear power station's premises.

Plant Reconstruction Approved

LD2504154292 Prague CSTK in English
2020 GMT 23 Apr 92

[Text] Bratislava April 22 (CSTK)—The Slovak Government has approved a project for a fundamental reconstruction of a nuclear power plant in west Slovakia, in keeping with measures set by Czechoslovakia's Atomic Energy Commission as a condition for the plant to continue functioning after 1995.

After hearing a report on the results of an analysis of the work of the nuclear power plant, the government agreed Wednesday to drafting a study which will envisage the plant's conversion into one working on a steam-gas basis. The measures set by the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission concern the plant's equipment, strengthening its resistance to fires and seismic tremors, processing radioactive waste and safety regulations.

The Slovak Government also consented to a loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, totalling 1,100 million Deutsche marks, which will be used to complete the construction of the nuclear power plant at Mochovce, west Slovakia.

Slovaks Discuss Nuclear Plant, Privatization

AU2404191092 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA
in Slovak 22 Apr 92 pp 1, 13

[Stanislav Tomanek report: "The Law on State Provided Social Support to Come Into Force in 1994"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The government approved a project to study the fundamental reconstruction of the V1 nuclear power station [in Jaslovské Bohunice] and the preparation of a study regarding the introduction of a steam-and-gas [paroplynový] cycle in the existing facilities in the V1 nuclear power station. The proposed reconstruction includes 81 measures oriented toward technological facilities, fire and seismic resistance, processing of radioactive waste, and safety. Since it seems that Slovakia is too small for utilizing nuclear energy, it should abandon its production after 2010. [passage omitted]

POLAND

Country Noted as Transit for Red Mercury Sales

92WP0199A Warsaw PRAWO I ZYCIE
in Polish No. 11, 14 Mar 92 pp 1, 7

[Article by Krzysztof Kilijanek: "Crime of the Week: Red Contraband"]

[Text] After narcotics, the time has now come for materials used in producing atomic bombs.

Red mercury is a strategic material, and in the West it fetches a price several times that of gold. There is no way to buy it legally, but what is money, big money, for? The transit channels of this death-producing product begin at our Eastern border and wend their way ever more frequently across Poland.

To all outside appearances, the stop on the highway was routine. A few kilometers just outside Grudziadz, policemen from the traffic division of the Torun Police stopped for inspection a Volkswagen minivan carrying three Bydgoszcz residents. Some jars and a metal barrel with writing in Russian and Chinese visible on the top, which the policemen discovered inside the vehicle, caught their attention. As it turned out later, the van was carrying 2.5 kilograms of mercuric iodide and over 310 kilograms of silver mercury.

There would have been nothing very strange in all this, were it not for the fact that mercuric iodide, better known as "red mercury," for nearly 30 years has been on the list of chemicals whose purchase and sale in Poland are prohibited. It has applications in the arms industry and is most likely one of the basic components used in producing the newest generation of atomic bombs.

It was no accident that the police stopped a vehicle carrying such dangerous cargo. An anonymous informant dialed Torun 997 and tipped off authorities about

the shipment and the transaction planned. It could be that the competition, probably also involved in this very lucrative business, needed to send the three Bydgoszcz men a message. It is possible to build up an enormous fortune very quickly by serving as intermediary in the sale of red mercury.

The three Bydgoszcz residents who were travelling with the loathsome cargo claim that they bought the mercury from some Russians in a Warsaw company, but unfortunately just a few days after the incident, they were unable to produce either the name or address. They met the potential buyer at the Brda Hotel in Bydgoszcz. They were to have finally concluded the arrangement at a parking lot in Grudziadz, receiving 250 million zlotys for the transaction. The police patrol stopped them a few kilometers away from that point.

This is our country's first case where Polish citizens mixed up in the red mercury trade have been stopped, and although the prosecution of the case is only beginning, we can say with nearly 100 percent certainty that the Bydgoszcz trio is only a tiny element in the well-organized groups smuggling red mercury, a very secret commodity that therefore brings enormous profits. On Western black markets, a kilogram of red mercury can bring up to half a million dollars, a dozen or so times as much as gold of the highest quality.

Red mercury does not occur in nature in its pure form. It appears in two forms: as a pink powder without the radiation harmful to the health of human beings, and as a highly radioactive dark red suspension.

Italian Judge Romano Dolce, who is prosecuting the smuggling of red mercury through Italy, says: "All we know about red mercury is that people talk about its tremendous significance in producing atomic bombs and that some countries dreaming of having weapons of mass destruction are willing to pay millions of dollars for the substance."

"The information I have shows that this raw material is unknown in Western nuclear technology," says Ennio Lazarini, a Milan nuclear research center professor, whose views are respected throughout the world.

"We recently asked the embassies of Russia, the United States, and Great Britain to give further details on this secret chemical compound. We received nearly the same answer from all three embassies. 'Nobody knows how to use it,' Yordan Sokolov, Bulgarian foreign affairs minister said publicly.

Nobody knows anything, but red mercury is bringing astonishing prices on the black market in the West. Why?

We can only guess the answer to this question. After all, declarations of ignorance in response to a question have sometimes proved to be untrue.

The former Soviet Union was a world power in the production of this strategic raw material, because it came from there in its purest form. So long as there was a strong, centralized state, it was practically impossible to reach the sources of production. After the collapse of the Soviet empire, an uncontrolled flow of mercury to the West began. It is true that Kremlin officials favoring the collapse in November 1991 consciously issued an absolute prohibition against trading in red mercury, but the prohibition was quickly withdrawn after Boris Yeltsin came to power.

"There is no government authority, but there is a military, atomic, and chemical industry, and whatever exists will be sold. They will sell, because they need dollars," an anonymous informant from the former USSR said in the columns of the Hungarian daily NEPSZABADSAG.

There are widening gaps and leaks in our eastern neighbor's atomic industry, and the countries ruthlessly trying to exploit this fact include some Third World nations that want to be called "atomic powers," to be more exact, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Iran.... These ideas were indirectly confirmed at the end of last week by Aleksander Gutsalov, deputy director of Russia's state committee on atomic security monitoring, who did not rule out the possibility of the illegal export of fissionable materials.

Gutsalov stated: "The attorneys on my committee only handle the monitoring of legal trade operations. In the event of the sale of natural uranium, as opposed to enriched ore, the restrictions imposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency simply do not apply. In this situation, we can only talk about the integrity of the people handling these affairs."

Except that it is hard to talk about integrity, when enormous amounts of money are involved. In the former Soviet republics, it has become an undeniable fact that there are structures involved in the sale of red mercury and other fissionable materials used mainly in nuclear technology. These structures initiate trade and smuggling, but what does this procedure look like? A Swiss liaison officer talked about it in the pages of the Italian publication L'UNITA.

The Office of State Protection handles certain "operations monitoring" activities and, owing to the significance of the problem, cannot reveal anything more on this subject. Polish Interpol and the border services are equally secretive on this subject.

Meanwhile, a few weeks ago, I managed purely by accident to learn something about the mechanisms governing the red mercury smuggling gangs. After one of last year's items on Soviet "Mafia" activity in Poland, a reader provided me with some very interesting material on the red mercury trade....

As in the West, the transactions are carried out through several intermediaries. The initial negotiations are conducted by fax, although it is not possible to establish our partner. Later, after initial acceptance, the seller sends a

sample of the material for analysis to the buyer, as one might do with a commission agent. The buyer has 48 hours to run the tests. After confirming that the commodity delivered meets the previously indicated description, which gives the specifications in detail, the buyer sends the seller the amount of money agreed upon to a bank account previously specified by the seller. The seller guarantees to the buyer—this is an exact quote—that the commodity will be sent directly through diplomatic channels to the buyer's airplane at the airport specified in the contract. The seller also guarantees that the buyer can collect the commodity from the free zone

of the airport and that, of course, all names of companies involved in the transaction will be kept absolutely secret.

A handwritten addition is visible on the documents: "If we get an IPCO (a type of letter of credit used by banks) going today, the deal will be next week. We are preparing the deal in Krakow." There was still a date on one of the documents, too, 15 August 1991. The offer was to buy 90.69 kilograms of red mercury at a price of \$388,000 per kilogram.

The question about whether Poland is a transit country for red mercury is now a purely rhetorical question.

ARGENTINA

Nuclear Agency Official Leaves for Meeting

PY2304024492 Buenos Aires TELAM
in Spanish 1939 GMT 22 Apr 92

[Text] Buenos Aires, 22 Apr (TELAM)—Manuel Mondino, the National Commission for Atomic Energy (CNEA) chairman, has stated that Argentina "will continue with its independent technological development."

Mondino made his remarks at Ezeiza Airport shortly before leaving for Vienna, Austria, where he will preside over a meeting of the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Mondino said: "Argentina continues to be among the 10 more advanced countries in the world because it has been able to profit well from its independent technological development."

BRAZIL

Piva Discusses Past Cooperation With Iraq

925M0345A Sao Paulo ISTOE SENHOR in Portuguese
18 Mar 92 pp 5-7

[Interview with Brigadier General Hugo de Oliveira Piva, Reserve, by Helio Contreiras; place and date not given. First two paragraphs are ISTOE SENHOR introduction]

[Text] Two tasks have occupied the time of Brigadier General Hugo de Oliveira Piva, Reserve—presiding over the Brotherhood of the Friends of Wine in the Sao Paulo city of Sao Jose dos Campos, and justifying his close relationship with the president of Iraq, Saddam Husayn. As we know, his collaboration with the dictator was not in the area of oenology. Piva, 65, is recognized by his peers as a brilliant specialist in space programs. He does not deny that he helped Iraq, but he justifies it this way: "We were on the side of the West, against Shiite fundamentalism." The general really would not be convincing if he attempted to deny that Brazil gave military aid to Iraq: on 9 March, a UN report furnished documentary proof of what specialists in the military field already knew: Brazil participated, along with other countries, in the nuclear program conceived by Iraqi strategists. Piva does not, however, go that far. He says "both I myself and Brazil" participated only in the design of one missile, the air-to-air missile.

The general refutes opinions to the contrary, such as that expressed by physicist Gary Milholin of the University of Wisconsin, in the United States, who said recently: "I do not believe Brig. Gen. Hugo Piva has told us all he knows about the subject." According to Milholin, Brazil collaborated with Husayn by passing uranium enrichment technology to Iraq. The general declares that "all those statements are irresponsible. And many Brazilians are accepting those untruths." A fan of the Sao Paulo Soccer Club and fond of Wagner, Mozart, and Beethoven, Brig. Gen. Piva began his education at a public school in Brotas, in the interior of Sao

Paulo State. Later he went on to the Air Force School in Rio de Janeiro, where he opted for the Air Force officer training course, took his higher education at the Aeronautical Technology Institute (ITA) in Sao Jose dos Campos, and earned a master's degree at the California Institute of Technology. In this interview, Hugo Piva explains in detail Brazil's technological cooperation with the government of Saddam Husayn.

[Contreiras] Sir, your role in the buildup of Iraq's military might has been sharply criticized. Now that a year has passed since the Gulf war, what is your assessment of the technological assistance to the Saddam Husayn regime?

[Piva] I acted in the context of cooperation by the Brazilian Government. Iraq was a privileged partner of the Western world. Until the eve of its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq was considered to be the savior, the one capable of holding back the Shiite expansion that was frightening several nations because of the possible threat to the petroleum supply. We were on the side of the Western world, alongside the Americans, French, and Germans besides other important allies. The enemy was Shiite fundamentalism.

[Contreiras] In what context did you get involved in the cooperation with Iraq?

[Piva] I never went to Baghdad in defiance of guidance from the Government of Brazil, especially not when I was still an officer on active duty in the Brazilian Air Force. And I did not transfer any technology that Brazil had absorbed from other nations. There have been many statements to that effect, some even by Brazilian ministers. It has become the argument used by the United States to deny us technology.

[Contreiras] What technology did Brazil transfer to Iraq?

[Piva] We only passed on to Iraq technologies that were created by our own group while it was at the Aerospace Technical Center—the CTA—at Engesa [Specialized Engineers, Inc.], Orbita, and HOP [Hugo de Oliveira Piva's consulting firm].

[Contreiras] Minister of Education Jose Goldemberg has insinuated that there have been transfers of technology that Brazil obtained from other countries.

[Piva] He explicitly said so. I think he was misinformed. It was irresponsible of him to make a statement of that sort.

[Contreiras] But does Brazil have the latest high technology?

[Piva] As Brazilians, we cannot accept the idea that we are not capable of creating First World technologies. Of course we are. We need only guarantee Brazilians the right kind of educational foundation, and they can compete with any country's experts. We should not accept permanent Third World status.

[Contreiras] Are there any grounds for the statements by some Brazilian and foreign government personnel to the effect that you passed so-called "sensitive technology" to Iraq?

[Piva] The technology that we transferred to Iraq was not sensitive technology, i.e. there was no transfer of technology that could be used to produce (long-range) ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, or nuclear submarines, as people are saying irresponsibly-I repeat, irresponsibly. What is worse is that many Brazilians are accepting this campaign of untruths.

[Contreiras] When did your participation in the cooperation with Iraq begin?

[Piva] In the first half of 1979 I was called upon by the National Security Council, because an Iraqi mission was about to arrive in Brasilia and I might have to provide some technological assistance. There were a lot of meetings, negotiations, and visits. I suggested cooperation in the aerospace field and in the development of tactical weapons, surface-to-surface rockets-short-range, the ones they purchased through Avibras [Avibras Aerospace Industry, Inc.] and an armored tank with special equipment, with a missile battery. That work went on until 1982.

[Contreiras] And then what happened to you?

[Piva] I was left with only the Brazilian space program, the Brazilian Complete Space Mission, which was enough to satisfy me professionally.

[Contreiras] When did you return to Iraq?

[Piva] In 1986, the Brazilian Government sent a mission to Baghdad, headed by Brigadier General Pedro Ivo Seixas, and it reestablished the contacts for cooperation. As a result, I went back to Baghdad in February 1987 and it was then that I suggested three projects: an air-to-air missile, an antitank missile, and an anti-aircraft missile. They decided on the air-to-air missile.

[Contreiras] However, while in the reserve, you continued the work for Saddam Husayn's regime.

[Piva] That was when I was vice president of a recently-formed company, Orbita, in which Embraer [Brazilian Aeronautics Company], Imbel [War Material Industry], Engesa, and Esca [Control and Automation Engineering and Services] had an interest. Once again, the cooperation had the backing of the Brazilian government.

[Contreiras] But in mid-1988 you left Orbita and continued to work for Iraq?

[Piva] Yes, in August 1988 I left that firm. At that time there was a contract between the Iraqi government and Engesa for the development of the air-to-air missile, and I acted as an Engesa consultant.

[Contreiras] And when Engesa went into Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1989?

[Piva] Then the Iraqis asked me to take over the contract, at the beginning of 1990. And we assumed the obligation with our own company, HOP.

[Contreiras] Hasn't Brazil suffered because of having traded arms to Iraq and ceded technology to them?

[Piva] No. Brazilians have unjustly accepted that label. We threw in the towel when we were winning the battle.

[Contreiras] What battle?

[Piva] The battle for a role in the international technology business. At that time, the United States and Europe were paying attention to their interests in Iraq. All the basic armaments were foreign-made. The only things made in Brazil were the Cascavel reconnaissance cars, the Urutu troop transports, and the Astros System. The Tucano training aircraft had also been sold.

[Contreiras] Did Iraq have a big investment in military power?

[Piva] An enormous investment. Military matters were their top priority.

[Contreiras] How much did they pay for Brazilian technological assistance?

[Piva] They paid market prices. I can't tell you how much.

[Contreiras] You once said that President Saddam Husayn was modernizing his country.

[Piva] He said the goal was to democratize Iraq gradually. He never got to implement that goal in practice, and so we do not know whether or not that was his intention. President Saddam Husayn really was modernizing his country and even trying to improve the delivery of some public services.

[Contreiras] Did you ever meet Saddam Husayn?

[Piva] I know him only by sight. My contacts were with the minister of industry. The Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization there has two sectors: one for production, and the other for research and development.

[Contreiras] If you were invited to participate in a technological assistance effort directed at other countries, would you go?

[Piva] Yes, provided the Brazilian Government approved the cooperation. The assistance given to Iraq did not signal a political choice. Iraq was a partner of Brazil. I was led to do that work by the Brazilian government, twice, in my capacity as an officer on active duty.

[Contreiras] The Gulf war ended a year ago. Wasn't it crazy for Iraq to invade Kuwait?

[Piva] It is hard to say what the reasons were for the invasion. They were having problems with Kuwait. As an ordinary citizen, I do not think there is any reason for a country to use force against another country. But after all, wars exist, and they have never ceased to exist since the beginning of human history.

[Contreiras] Was Baghdad already in a position to make an atomic bomb?

[Piva] No. There was speculation to that effect right after the invasion of Kuwait, in order to justify the armed

intervention. Iraq did not have the atomic bomb and would not be in a position to have it for many years.

[Contreiras] Minister Jose Goldemberg insists that the Brazilian military wanted to have an atomic bomb. And there have also been a lot of comments to the effect that Brazilian uranium was exported secretly to Iraq.

[Piva] I followed the progress of nuclear research projects without participating directly in them, and I was never aware of a plan for a bomb.

[Contreiras] And what about the secret exports of uranium?

[Piva] I had no knowledge of secret exports of uranium. I don't know anything about that matter because I never took part in any secret negotiations.

[Contreiras] Is there any relationship between the bomb project and military cooperation with Iraq?

[Piva] I am unaware of the plan for the Brazilian bomb. I think there are people that like to spin fantasies—to disguise what, I don't know, but they develop fantasies. We do not need an atomic bomb. It is much more useful to Brazil to develop technologies in several sectors. In the aerospace field, for example, we are respected. And no country can build an atomic bomb overnight.

[Contreiras] What does a country need, basically?

[Piva] You have to have highly skilled personnel, technological capabilities in several areas, and plenty of money available.

[Contreiras] Didn't the technology that Brazil transferred to Iraq cause an imbalance in the Middle East in favor of Saddam Husayn?

[Piva] That is a fallacy. When people say that, they do not go into details, they do not discuss the matter in depth, they just touch on it superficially. The technology we gave Iraq would not cause any strategic or tactical imbalance.

[Contreiras] Why not?

[Piva] Iraq had access to the air-to-air rockets (similar to the ones that we designed). It had hundreds of rockets of that type: the Russian Atol, the French Magic, and the U.S. Sidewinder.

[Contreiras] Various statements have been made concerning a ticklish subject: The United States let Iraq have a computer that could be used for calculations pertaining to armaments production. Is that true?

[Piva] Yes. And that's not all. When we were at the CTA, a division of the Air Force needed a Vax computer from the United States. The U.S. Department of State never gave us the authorization to import it. When we were in Iraq, within two months the Iraqis were able to buy the Vax directly from the United States. This is equipment that can be used for long-range ballistic missile calculations.

[Contreiras] American physicist Gary Milholin, of the University of Wisconsin, says that you have not told the whole story about Brazil's cooperation with Iraq. Have you told everything?

[Piva] I have related what is essential on all the important points. I know Professor Milholin. He is a member of the congressional committee against nuclear proliferation. In that incident, he was speculating about me. I did not furnish any nuclear cooperation to Iraq.

[Contreiras] The UN report says that Brazil furnished 27 tons of uranium oxide to Iraq. Did you participate in that clandestine operation?

[Piva] As I have already said, I had no role in any clandestine negotiation. I did not provide any nuclear cooperation to Iraq.

[Contreiras] What is your position on nuclear proliferation?

[Piva] That is obvious. I'm against it. I believe it is unacceptable to opt for atomic weapons or any other type of weapon that causes deaths on a massive scale. A nation does not need to resort to the atomic bomb in order to assure its sovereignty. It would be better, as in the case of Brazil, to opt for development of conventional weapons technology.

[Contreiras] What may be the consequences of the decision by the Brazilian Government to keep Brazilian experts from cooperating with other countries?

[Piva] I learned of that decision when I was in Miami, while watching the news on CNN. The report was treated with a lot of sensationalism. It doesn't affect me at all, because I'm out of the business. In my case, I never influenced, and never would influence, the context in which technical assistance was given to Iraq.

[Contreiras] Do you suppose there are international interests that oppose Brazil's participation in worldwide technical cooperation?

[Piva] I am not supposing. I believe there are.

[Contreiras] When did your work in Iraq end? After the invasion of Kuwait?

[Piva] Right after the invasion of Kuwait came an embargo, approved by the United Nations, endorsed by Brazil. I could not stay there.

[Contreiras] Why have you withdrawn from the aerospace field?

[Piva] International cooperation got too complex. Right now any cooperation effort with countries like Iraq and Libya is almost impossible.

[Contreiras] What is your new field of endeavor?

[Piva] Commodities. We are exporting different kinds of products. Recently we sold black pepper to the United States. We also sold aluminum and steel sheets, among other products.

EGYPT

UN 'Silence' on Israeli Nuclear Arms Viewed

NC2204055792 Cairo MENA in Arabic
2229 GMT 21 Apr 92

[Text] Cairo, 21 Apr (MENA)—In an editorial to be published on 22 April, AL-AKHBAR says: "We are overwhelmed by sorrow and regret as we follow the UN reports on the demolition of all the sites and equipment in Iraq that are believed to have potential uses in research leading to the production of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction."

The paper continues: "These feelings of sorrow and regret are not caused by the demolition of these sites and capabilities because Egypt continues to be a strong supporter of nuclear nonproliferation in the Middle East. The regret is caused by two things. The first is the squandering of huge sums belonging to the Iraqi people for the sake of a madman's illusory dream of leadership. The second is the silence about another danger in the region represented by Israel's nuclear bombs and missiles."

The paper says: "At a time when some pro-Israel members of the U.S. Congress vie with each other in casting suspicion on the way certain Arab countries are using the traditional weapons they bought from the United States with their own money to defend themselves, we do not see one single congressman or U.S. Defense Department official raising the issue of Israel's exclusive possession of a nuclear arsenal in this region. Many countries are demanding that weapons of mass destruction be eliminated from this region because of its critical importance to the world's security and peace."

INDIA

Delegation in Moscow Discussing Technology Transfer

\$200 Million Contract 'Delayed'

BK1904165692 Delhi All India Radio Network
in English 1530 GMT 19 Apr 92

[Text] A delegation led by the space secretary, Dr. U.R. Rao, is now in Moscow following the Russian Government's request for an early meeting to discuss details of the transfer of rocket technology. An External Affairs Ministry spokesman said in New Delhi that the Russian ambassador informed the foreign secretary in New Delhi on Friday [17 April] that his government is now more in tune with international thinking on nonproliferation and wants India and Russia to adopt a practical approach for cooperation in this field.

The spokesman denied reports that the \$200-million contract has been suspended. He said the signing of the agreement was delayed because of political uncertainty in Russia. He said the Russians have not conveyed the suspension or discontinuation of any contract.

The left parties have criticized the United States for allegedly pressurizing [as heard] Russia to suspend the transfer of rocket technology to India. The CPI [Communist Party of India] National Council secretary, Mr. Chaturanand Mishra, said in New Delhi that the reported American move will deprive India of the opportunity to develop its own research and development activities.

U.S. 'Pressure' Criticized

BK2004163292 Delhi All India Radio Network
in English 1530 GMT 20 Apr 92

[Excerpt] Members of the Lok Sabha were unanimous in criticizing the United States for its reported pressure on Russia to stop transfer of rocket technology to India. Opposition members took serious exception to the government for not placing the facts before the house and warned it of serious consequences. They also demanded a statement from the prime minister on the issue.

Raising the issue during zero hour, Mr. George Fernandes of Janata Dal said it affects the sovereignty of the nation and demanded a special discussion. He was joined by senior members from the opposition who said that Washington was discriminating against India, not only on the space program, but also on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and other issues. They called for an all-party meeting to formulate a national policy on the issue for safeguarding on India's national interests. The ruling party members, criticizing the American stand, were unanimous that the facts of the case should be ascertained and wanted the government to make a statement before the house could take any decision. The speaker, Mr. Shivraj Patil, ruled that a special discussion would be taken up after the debate on the demands for grants of the External Affairs Ministry if it is felt necessary. [passage omitted]

ISRAEL

German, Japanese Nuclear Weapons Sales Possible

92AE0271Y Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
16 Mar 92 p B1

[Article by Eliahu Slepter: "Nuclear Disarray"]

[Text] The changes that have taken place in the relations of the powers in the Far East are also reflected in the arms race in the Middle East. Instead of remaining stagnant, it has received a new push by the failure of the United States to defeat Saddam Husayn and to establish unchallenged hegemony for itself in the region.

North Korea's accelerated penetration of the arms markets in the Middle East is part of the new wave of the equipping of Asian countries with sophisticated

weapons, particularly when Europe is entering the age of arms limitations. In many places in Asia, there is a feeling that Moscow's constraining hand with regard to regional arms races has disappeared, and Washington's hand has also weakened.

The terminal illness of the socialist economies, which caused the fall of the Communist regime and the demise of the Soviet Union, and which is now necessitating the renewal of the reforms in China, is also rocking the foundation of the regime in North Korea.

But North Korea is a special case even in terms of orthodox Communist regimes. On the background of Confucian obedience to the ruler and an isolationist tradition, President Kim Il-song instituted personal totalitarian rule, to the point that Ceausescu of Romania and Xhaga of Albania paled next to him. A new generation has also grown in North Korea, which has started to compare the miserable standard of living to the prosperity in South Korea.

Kim Il-song still views the south as the primary danger to his regime, and seeks to protect it with a combination of military deterrence and improving the standard of living with the profits of military export. To this end, he hopes to take advantage of the large investments in armaments development, offering advanced weapons technologies to third world countries, from Pakistan and Syria to Algeria. They were previously clients of the Soviet Union, and are interested in a new source of supply.

It is rather clear that the White House and the State Department were not interested in stopping the ship that transported missiles to Iran and Syria. This could be heard in the responses of the Pentagon spokesman even before the Da Hong Ho [unclear, apparently the name of the ship] reached the straits of Hormuz. The legal fact that the U.S. Navy has a mandate from the United Nations to prevent the passage of ships carrying prohibited cargo to Iraq, alone, was the less important reason for Washington's position. The more important reason was that the White House and the State Department are afraid to anger the North Korean Government, which they hope to convince not to complete the development of the nuclear bomb.

The placating line of the White House was reflected in the controversy on this matter between State Department representatives and the CIA before the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives. The head of the CIA, Robert Gates, reported that within several months, North Korea will be capable of manufacturing a nuclear bomb. The representatives of the foreign ministry claimed that "there is no sufficient, firm evidence of this," and that North Korea needs another few years in order to manufacture a bomb.

The State Department is likely to repeat the bad mistake that it made with regard to Baghdad's intentions and nuclear capability. It seems that Baker and his aides again think that pleasant words will stop a ruler who sees the "ultimate weapon" within his reach.

Last weekend, the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives was informed that P'yongyang has completed the development of a new missile with a range of 1,000 kilometers, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead with the power of half of the Hiroshima bomb. It has already offered the new missile to several Arab countries. All of Japan's major cities will be within the range of a missile stationed in North Korea. The cities of Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and southern France will be within the range of missiles of this type, should they be stationed in northern Africa. Cairo will also be within the range of missiles from Syrian territory.

The new Korean missile—and the indifference of the State Department in light of the missile sales—is likely to create a new push in nuclear armament. This may strengthen the circles in Bonn and Tokyo that claim that in an age of nuclear bombs for whoever hungers for them, Germany and Japan must also consider amending the principle of not equipping themselves with nuclear arms.

Arms Sales Concerns Said Behind 'Patriot' Report

92AE0271Z Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
16 Mar 92 p B1

[Article by Ze'ev Schiff: "All the Means for Getting Rid of Competitors"]

[Text] Israel is not always the epitome of righteousness when it involves its relations with the United States. A good example is the Jonathan Pollard espionage affair, which is causing us continued damage. Nonetheless, the claim implied by the well orchestrated general offensive that began last week in the United States, whereby the ungrateful Jewish state is capable of anything, is by no means acceptable.

Behold, the Americans provided Israel with an important weapons system, Patriot missiles, in order to defend itself against the Iraqi Scuds during the last war, and the Jews immediately sold the missile secrets to China. Greed is what motivates Israel. It is not concerned whether the Chinese missiles will be able to overcome the U.S. defense system.

The diabolism implied toward Israel refers to its willingness to sell the Chinese technology that will improve ground-to-ground missiles that it is about to sell to Arab countries; these, of course, will overcome the Patriots that are also defending Israel.

This is truly a grave charge, and it must not be left pending. If, indeed, Israel committed such an act, selling secret Patriot technology, then Minister of Defense Moshe Arens must immediately submit his resignation, along with everyone who was involved in the affair. If, however, it turns out that this is a false charge, an apology is insufficient. Whoever submitted such a report

to the highest levels in Washington and to the American public, even if he is the head of the CIA, must pack his bags and get out.

It is clear that an American intelligence report exists on this matter. Even before Arens departed for the United States, he was told by a senior American official that the report was based upon credible sources. Even prior to that, the claim was presented to the ambassador, Zalman Shoval. It was known in Israel that publication of the story was imminent. It was written in the intelligence report that the Chinese had obtained secret information about the Patriot technology, perhaps even the missile, itself. An accusatory finger is pointed at Israel.

The fact that this refers to a report by U.S. intelligence need not cause our knees to shake. We recently have seen a few of their incredible mistakes. I know that even within the U.S. Administration there are those who doubt the credibility of the sources upon which the report is based. Particularly on the matter of the Patriot, there is little difficulty in examining the charge. Israel has a very small number of Patriot batteries. It is no problem to open up the system and see whether any attempt has been made to penetrate the black boxes, in order to decipher the secret technology. Experts tell me that such deciphering requires a tremendous investment by many people, expensive equipment, and a long period of time, between one and two years.

The charge with regard to the sale of the Arrow missile technology which, incidentally, is Israeli and not American, as the WALL STREET JOURNAL wrote, will also turn out to be false. The other charges raised by the WALL STREET JOURNAL are another matter. In an article that was published last weekend, there is a mixture of a few true things and stories from ten years ago or more, together with strange errors indicating that the writers are not familiar with the Israeli defense industries—for example, that Israel sold ground-to-air missile technology, while it does not manufacture these missiles at all. Or the old, repetitive story about the cluster bombs, 400 in number, that Dayan spoke of 13 years ago as minister of foreign affairs. Even when Israel was charged with employing the American cluster bombs in contravention of the law, did it not occur to them that Israel, like other industrial countries, including Chile, had been capable of manufacturing 'made in Israel' cluster bombs for years?

The claim that Israel sold the Python 3 missile to China has been repeated for years. In the past, the American claim was that, by so doing, we were upsetting the

delicate balance of power between China and Taiwan. Today, the claim is that this is none other but the U.S. AIM-9L missile. The similarity is like that between a successful Japanese car and a more expensive American car. The diameter and fuse of the Israeli missile are different, as are its other stabilizers. Experts say that it was operational approximately one year before the model that they are now claiming Israel copied. In any case, we received the AIM-9L after we had the Python, which was manufactured by Rafael. I do not know whether it, like other equipment, contains American components, screws, or detectors, etc.... The question is whether it is prohibited to sell these components freely on the market, anywhere.

The Americans voiced a similar claim against Israel with regard to the Shafrir-2 missile, following its success in the Yom Kippur War. They then purchased two missiles [and] disassembled them, at which point their claims changed. It can be revealed that several American industries are now courting Israel, in order to receive technological information from it.

There are true details in this story, as well, but these do not justify such a general offensive, unless a special reason lies behind it. Why is Israel, of all countries, the recipient of special status, even though the report, which was prepared at the State Department, refers to other countries? The economic reason fits in well with the political tension and the turbid relations among leaders from both sides.

The U.S. defense industry, which is encountering severe limitation of its markets, wants not only to sell as much as possible to the Arab countries, but to remove any competitor, small as it may be, from its path. It is finding easy accomplices within the administration, and all means are appropriate toward this end.

PAKISTAN

Defense Minister on Nonproliferation

BK2204070992 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network
in Urdu 0600 GMT 22 Apr 92

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Speaking to the Japanese ambassador, Kunio Muraoka, in Rawalpindi, the defense minister said Pakistan has always been ready to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty with India. Lauding Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif's proposal for a five-nation conference to make South Asia a nuclear-free zone, the Japanese envoy said it will help end tension in the region.

U.S. Decision on High-Tech CIS Imports Viewed

LD1704215492 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1701 GMT 17 Apr 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[Text] Moscow, April 17 TASS—"The recent decision by the United States to lift restrictions on imports of high technology from CIS countries does not mean that we will deal on that market tomorrow," said Sergey Yermakov, director of the press centre of the Russian Ministry for Nuclear Energy.

Speaking in an ITAR-TASS interview, Yermakov cited examples from the past when competition from the CIS on the world military market was countered by American firms. Yermakov said he did not see reasons forcing them to change that position now.

According to the Technosnabexport foreign economic joint-stock company which sells nuclear materials abroad, the share of CIS countries in the world uranium market is approximately eight per cent, while the former USSR accounts for 45 per cent of the proven deposits of uranium in the world.

Yermakov said that the total uranium deposits in CIS countries are estimated at two million tonnes. These countries may supply to the world market not less than 5,000 tonnes of natural uranium. However last year's attempt by Russia to increase its sales of uranium on the world market were resisted primarily by American firms.

Yermakov said this position explains recent publications in the Western press about illegal sales of nuclear materials from the former USSR on the international market.

While rejecting these allegations, he emphasised that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which exercises strict control over the movement of fission material, had never made such accusations against Russia.

According to Yermakov, the U.S. decision is viewed by specialists as "political."

"It is one thing to make a political decision, and quite another to implement it." No documents detailing the decision have been received by the Russian ministry.

U.S. Stand on Rocket Deal With India Viewed

LD1404182892 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1448 GMT 14 Apr 92

[By ITAF-TASS parliamentary correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[Text] Moscow, 14 Apr—A group of Russian people's deputies demands that a commission of deputies be set up to investigate not only U.S. attempts to ban Russian rocket engine deliveries to India but also the Russian Foreign Ministry's stand on this problem.

At tonight's Congress sitting, Vitaliy Sevastyanov read a deputy's question, addressed to the Russian president and parliament speaker, which says that Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, at a recent European foreign ministers conference, agreed with U.S. Administration allegations that an agreement between Glavkosmos and India breaches the Missile Technology Control Regime, which Russia only intends to join.

Vitaliy Sevastyanov noted that a \$200-million contract was concluded in January 1991 for developing a cryogenic stage for an Indian rocket booster, which can put communication satellites into a geostationary orbit. Under pressure from the U.S. military-industrial complex, the U.S. Administration insists that work stop and does not agree to an international expertise, the people's deputy said. In the event that cooperation with India continues, the United States threatens to apply sanctions against Glavkosmos as early as this month. "They want to push us out of the foreign market of high rocket and space technology like kittens," the deputy said. Unfortunately, Russia's Foreign Ministry is not only unable to resist this but also agrees with the U.S. stand and is pressuring Glavkosmos, he added.

Morozov Cited on U.S. Visit, Nuclear Arms

LD2204215292 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1950 GMT 22 Apr 92

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Nikolay Zaika—TASS]

[Text] Kiev, 22 Apr (ITAR-TASS)—Ukraine is ready to implement all commitments under the agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms and to adhere to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, Konstantin Morozov, minister of defense of the republic, stated. He held a news conference today on the results of the visit by a Ukrainian military delegation to the United States.

The defense minister stated that while the process of the limitation of strategic offensive arms is being implemented, Ukraine insists upon having the status of an equal side. As far as tactical nuclear weapons are concerned, international monitoring [kontrol] of their withdrawal, stockpiling, and destruction is necessary, the minister noted.

The delegation met Secretary of State James Baker, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, and other U.S. political and military leaders during its visit to the United States. Questions of mutual relations between the two countries in the military and other spheres were discussed. The delegation put forward Ukraine's position on the main problems of the military and political situation in the republic and familiarized the American side with the republic's defense policy and military doctrines. The economic situation in Ukraine was also outlined. The military delegation affirmed once again that the republic excludes the use of force in deciding any political, economic and other questions.

The minister of defense also briefed the news conference on the conclusion of an agreement between the military departments of Ukraine and Hungary. A Ministry of Defense delegation of the republic is presently in Czechoslovakia, where a similar agreement is due to be signed. Drafts of such agreements with Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania are being examined. These countries, Konstantin Morozov stressed, link their security with Ukraine's independence.

The work of the delegation affirmed, Konstantin Morozov noted in conclusion, that Ukraine is open to mutual relations with other states, including ties with their armed forces.

Admiral Defends Nuclear Sub Safety Record

LD2404202692 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1420 GMT 24 Apr 92

[Excerpt] In this morning's Mayak "Panorama" we were acquainted with a report in the U.S. weekly PARADE that U.S. admirals would like to sink nuclear warships belonging to the former Soviet Navy in the interests of world security. They claim that the nuclear reactors aboard submarines are unsafe. We asked Rear-Admiral Valeriy Aleksin, chief navigator of our Navy, to comment on this report. Here is what he said:

Throughout its history our nuclear submarine fleet has lost three atomic submarines, together with 98 crew. The U.S. Navy has lost two nuclear submarines at sea. Twice as many crewmen perished in these sinkings. When our submarines sank, the nuclear reactors were shut down immediately and the radiation situation did not change in subsequent years. But when the U.S. submarines Thresher and Scorpion sank, there was not enough time to do this. It should be pointed out that the accident rate of U.S. submarines has not come down over the last five years. But there has been a threefold reduction in the accident rate of the former Soviet Navy. [passage omitted]

NATO Statement on CIS Nuclear Destiny Eyed

LD2204225592 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 22 Apr 92

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] The NATO administration in Brussels has issued a statement expressing serious concern over the destiny of the nuclear weapons deployed on the ex-Soviet Union's territory. Here is a commentary by Yuriy Solton.

This statement reminds of trust as the most important element of normal inter-state relations. The newly independent states set up on the fragments of the collapsed Soviet empire have been making their first steps on the international arena. Money is being given to them in advance and it depends on their further behavior how smoothly they will integrate into the world community.

The statement points out that, recognizing the independence of former Soviet nuclear republics, Western allies hope to see them joining the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as nuclear-free states. That no progress has been reached in this direction is alarming, the statement says.

Earlier, the heads of the four former Soviet nuclear states—Russia, Byelarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine—agreed that Russia alone would preserve a nuclear status. The rest are to move all tactical nuclear weapons available to the Russian territory for destruction by 1 July. Kazakhstan has already finished the job and Byelarus is making its best to keep up with the schedule. As far as Ukraine is concerned, it's not clear whether it will manage to get through in the remaining two months after suspending the transfer of missiles several weeks ago. The fate of the strategic weapons the three republics are to get rid of within two years is also vague, with Kazakhstan taking a wait and see position, Byelarus believing it will need more time and Ukraine keeping silent on the matter, which may be even more dangerous since Kiev also lays claims to the Black Sea Fleet, partly equipped with strategic nuclear weapons.

It looks like Ukraine is willing to become a full-fledged signatory to the START treaty, which would be a flagrant violation of the principle of nuclear non-proliferation. Russia, for its part, has been doing all possible to provide for the realization of the earlier-reached agreements, being guided neither by ambition nor by considerations of prestige. The nuclear status is a heavy burden for it to bear, but as long as even a hypothetical probability [as heard] of a nuclear conflict remains, Russia will have to keep nuclear weapons, although it firmly intends to fulfill its obligations on maximum nuclear arms reduction and observe the principle of openness in scrapping nuclear arsenals.

It remains to be seen whether the leaders of the three other former Soviet nuclear republics will overcome the temptation to use the nuclear factor for their self-establishment on the international arena. The NATO statement points out that the presence of nuclear weapons in these republics and the nuclear testing activity which used to be carried out there cannot serve as the reason for treating them as nuclear powers.

Controversy Over Rocket Sale to India

927Q0138A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by Nikolay Paklin: "Russian Rockets for India: Delhi Accuses Washington of Interference"]

[Text] Delhi—The Indian parliament has come to the defense of Russia against the Americans. Members of parliament from the governing party and the opposition displayed rare unanimity when discussing the question of the U.S. "pressure" on Russia aimed at preventing supplies of space and rocket technology to India. A proposal concerning the passage of a parliamentary resolution condemning the U.S. interference in the internal affairs of

other states was submitted. Another proposal concerns a suspension of military cooperation between India and the United States and the cancellation of joint exercises of the navies of India and the United States planned for the fall. Opposition leader L.K. Adwani saw the U.S. Administration's actions as an attempt to make India its satellite.

The reason for such sharp criticism were publications in the Russian and Indian press to the effect that the American authorities were opposed to realization of an agreement between our Glavkosmos [Main Administration for the Development and Use of Space Technology for the National Economy and Science] and the Indian Space Research Organization. This agreement provides for supplies of our space technology to India, including engines of the final stages of the rocket for putting satellites into near-Earth orbit. According to the publications, the United States deemed this agreement contrary to the Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR] and threatened Russia with serious economic sanctions.

I would recall that the former Soviet Union not only did not subscribe to the NTCR but even publicly criticized it as discriminatory. But the danger of unsupervised supplies of missiles is attested if only by the experience of Iraq, which brought them crashing down on Israel. Now the situation has changed. Evaluating realistically the dangerous nature of the spread of nuclear weapons around the world, the Russian leadership has announced its intention to subscribe to the international MTCR as soon as possible. A stock-taking, so to speak, of our missile agreements with overseas partners would seem natural in the light of this.

"As far as I know," A.M. Dryukov, Russian ambassador in Delhi, told your correspondent, "the cooperation of Glavkosmos and the Indian Space Research Organization is of a purely peaceful nature. We proposed to India joint consultations and expressed a desire that these take place as soon as possible, what is more, in order to allay the concern of the parties to the control regime. And prior to the start of the consultations, the Russian leadership adopted the decision to suspend supplies of space and missile technology. Incidentally, an Indian delegation headed by U.R. Rao, leader of India's space program, has already gone to Moscow to take part in the negotiations. I see nothing sensational in any of this...."

Judging by the sharp debate in the Indian parliament, our Indian partners have a different view of this problem. It is shared by some Russian diplomats working in Delhi also. "The U.S. aim is to eliminate Russia's military and space industry," one of our diplomats, having given permission for his opinion to be published, told me in private. "It is important to them for this to deprive us of overseas orders, thereby undermining trust in us in the world. In this way, the United States intends to strengthen its role of sole world leader."

India is calling attention to the fact that the contract between Glavkosmos and the Indian Space Research

Organization is of economic significance for our countries. Its value is estimated at approximately \$400 million. And, as is known, India is settling accounts with us with supplies of commodities we need, foodstuffs included.

Of course, any cooperation in the space sphere is a delicate business. From the peaceful use of rocket engineering to military use is but a single step. The international community is worried by India's nuclear program. This worry is fueled by India's categorical refusal on various pretexts to subscribe to the international regime of nuclear nonproliferation. India's top leaders repeat incessantly that India does not intend to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to which the signatures of the vast majority of the world's states are appended. Delhi also rejects the proposal for the conversion of South Asia into a zone free of nuclear weapons without presenting practical alternative proposals in exchange.

India Fears 'Scattered' Nuclear Command

*LD2204220592 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1128 GMT 22 Apr 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksey Kuznetsov]

[Text] New Delhi April 22 TASS—"The Soviet Union's break-up and changes in Eastern Europe may unpredictably affect the military balance and increase the danger linked with what countries will possess nuclear weapons," says an annual report released by the Indian Defence Ministry.

"The dialogue on disarmament, started between the United States and countries-successors of the USSR, raises hopes that new agreements will bring about a gradual bilateral liquidation of all types of mass destruction weapons," the document notes.

At the same time, the Soviet Union's transformation is fraught with dangerous consequences and has produced "several potential areas of tension, because the disintegration process has led to the emergence of de facto nuclear states. The huge Soviet strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons arsenal is under scattered command and control."

Armenia Accused of Using Chemical Weapons

*OW2504125792 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1243 GMT 25 Apr 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Azeri Defense Ministry has accused Armenia of using chemical weapons in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Ministry issued a statement April 24 saying that in recent days the city of Shusha and nearby villages were shelled with poison gas bombs. The statement notes that the fact was confirmed by medical expertise.

The Azeri Defense Ministry urged the international community to condemn the use of chemical weapons in the Armenian-Azeri conflict.

Another statement by the Azeri Defense Ministry says that earlier this week "local self-defense force" started to guard a military warehouse near the city of Gyandzha due to "serious concern of the city residents" over events at a military warehouse in Balaovit (Armenia). According to the statement, there have been reports on possible diversions at warehouses near Gyandzha by Armenian forces.

As a result of an operation launched by CIS forces April 22 night to expel Azeri units from the warehouse, one Azeri, father of 6 children, was killed and 4 servicemen of the Azeri Defense Ministry wounded, the statement says.

The Defense Ministry states that the use of force by CIS troops stationed on the republic's territory leads to further aggravation of the explosive situation in the republic. The ministry expresses hope that in future conflicts will be resolved by peaceful means.

Accusations 'Refuted'

LD2504203292 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1900 GMT 25 Apr 92

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense has accused Armenia of using chemical weapons in Karabakh. The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Defense Committee has refuted this information.

News agencies report that shelling has intensified, and the number of casualties on both sides has also increased. Helicopters, Grad units, and large-caliber artillery guns are being used in fighting.

Explosion at Tomsk-7 Complex Reported

OW2304170192 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1613 GMT 23 Apr 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] There was an explosion of liquid nitrogen at a chemical plant in the restricted town of Tomsk-7. One person died and two were rushed to hospital. The chemical plant is part of the defence complex. It produces nuclear fuel. The management has asked local residents to stay calm saying there was no radiation leaks.

Ecology Minister Recommends Reactor Shut Down

OW2304192192 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1825 GMT 23 Apr 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The most dangerous for ecology sites at the Russian territory are the atomic reactors of Chernobyl type which must be shut down but not reconstructed, the Russian Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources said Thursday [23 April] at a news conference devoted to the visit of the member of the European Communities Commission for the Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection Carlo Ripa di Meana.

The minister noted that from the economic point of view shutting down of some atomic power stations will force other enterprises, namely metallurgical, to use energy saving technologies. One fourth of the energy resources can be saved by exploiting them.

Defense Minister Pledges Nonnuclear Neutrality

PM2304152192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant General P. Kozlovskiy, Byelarus Defense Minister, by Mikhail Shimanskiy, date not given: "First Interview by First Defense Minister of Byelarus"]

[Excerpts] Minsk—A session of the Byelarus Supreme Soviet has appointed Lieutenant General P. Kozlovskiy, formerly chief of staff of the Byelarusian Military District, as the republic's defense minister. [passage omitted]

[Shimanskiy] What is the essence of Byelarus' military doctrine?

[Kozlovskiy] In the declaration of state sovereignty, Byelarus called itself a neutral and nonnuclear state. That right was earned by its people over many bitter and hard centuries. Surely there is no state in Europe which has experienced so much calamity and misery through war in its history as Byelarus. One quarter of the population died in the conflagration of the last war alone. Our republic does not intend to attack anyone, all tactical nuclear munitions have already been withdrawn from its territory, and the strategic ones are next in line. A neutral Byelarus does not need nuclear weapons.

Byelarus Arms To Be Withdrawn in 'Few Months'

LD2304093992 Moscow Programma Radio Odin Network in Russian 0800 GMT 23 Apr 92

[Text] Lieutenant General Pavel Kozlovskiy, who has been appointed Byelarusian defense minister, has announced that all nuclear weapons will be withdrawn from the republic in the next few months. They will be taken to Russia for subsequent destruction.

Scientists Work on Nuclear Rocket Motor

PM1904174192 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 15 Apr 92 p 1

[RIKA report: "Flights to Mars"]

[Text] Physicists of the scientific and technical complex set up on the basis of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site are working on development of a nuclear rocket motor capable of sending a manned spacecraft to Mars. This work has become possible thanks to the conversion of the test site carried out by decree of the president of Kazakhstan. Scientists now have three nuclear test reactors at their disposal.

Atomic Veteran Reflects on Past, Future

PM2104154892 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
16 Apr 92 p 4

[Interview with Yevgeniy Negin, general and academician, by Vladimir Gubarev, datelined Arzamas-16 and Moscow; date not given: "Nuclear Sunset: Conversation with General and Academician Ye. Negin on Atomic Weapons—Their Past, Present, and Future"—first two and final two paragraphs are Gubarev introduction and postscript]

[Excerpts] Arzamas-16—Moscow—I first met with Yevgeniy Arkadyevich in the desert. We were unable to talk at the time: A furious gas gusher was making such a hell of a row that after a few minutes my ears were blocked and we could only communicate by gestures. [passage omitted]

But now I was greeted by not just General Yevgeniy Arkadyevich Negin, but Academician Negin. [passage omitted]

[Gubarev] Yevgeniy Arkadyevich, what do nuclear weapons mean to you?

[Negin] Don't expect a simple answer. On the one hand, I am very familiar with this area. At least the technical aspect of it. And I was working in it until the last day of my service. On the other hand, I appreciate that nuclear weapons are devices to which there is no alternative—in the sense of their effect upon the surrounding world. I appreciate that mankind is far from perfectly organized, that it has been divided, and remains divided today too, I think, into at least two camps (I don't know what to call them now, but previously they were socialism and capitalism). We have still not entered into the kind of relationship with America that means we can embrace each other on every corner and disarm ourselves for all to see. So long as America has nuclear weapons, I think that we should have them too. And as I "made it" to where the weapons are produced, I consider it my duty to work with top efficiency. [passage omitted]

[Gubarev] What spheres of science has this technology stimulated, in your view?

[Negin] The most diverse spheres! First, medium-energy physics. It has made extraordinary progress. Then the

theory of explosions and detonation. [passage omitted] Incidentally, a virtually new instrument-making industry has been created and it has matched world standards to date. Heavens, I forgot computing! I should have started with that...It cannot be said that a bomb is designed as such, because theoretical physicists first have to do all the calculation and computations. Therefore the development of computers in our country came in the first instance from us...Incidentally, there were no machines here during the initial stage, the calculations were done manually....However, we have always lagged behind the Americans in terms of the power and speed of computers.

[Gubarev] And in nuclear weapons in general?

[Negin] If there is a gap, it is a negligible one. And in some areas we are ahead....

[Gubarev] Don't secrets get stolen?

[Negin] It is not easy...Incidentally, there is a worldwide stir being raised: They say that a kilogram of enriched uranium-235 has been discovered somewhere. And they frighten everyone by saying that a bomb is being made! But you need 10-15 times that quantity of this uranium to have a bomb rather than mere playing around...It must be understood that our industry is extraordinarily sophisticated and costly, it demands incredible effort and a powerful industrial base.

[Gubarev] When did you first attend tests?

[Negin] It was in 1953...I had to travel to the test range. We sat down on a knoll. We put on dark glasses, and then heard "zero." My first impression was that I was looking at a furnace. It was 31 km away, but I clearly felt the heat on my face. It was my first impression of its power...Giant clouds then rose up, ascending to somewhere in the stratosphere....

[Gubarev] Was your interest purely professional?

[Negin] There's no escaping the emotion. Although, of course, you are waiting to see: Will it work, or not? Sometimes it didn't come off...There is professional satisfaction if the experiment works. That is natural.

[Gubarev] Did you often attend explosions?

[Negin] I attended virtually all the explosions carried out by our institute. I was the scientific leader at about half of them. So I have seen more than enough. In the latter half of my test activity I was able to determine the yield pretty accurately by eye, but for some reason I was never included on the list of physical instruments...However, talking about myself, and with complete seriousness, I do not regret having devoted my life—and I am now 72—to this problem. I think that we did put off World War III. For a long time or not—I don't know, but at least for the time that has elapsed. We managed to maintain parity in a pretty skillful way, and every time they (if you believe the newspapers, that is) decided on a nuclear attack, it was countermanded precisely because a new kind of weapon emerged in our country which rendered an attack disadvantageous or its success dubious...No one intends to attack us because of parity, but the situation could change if we lose it. And I have no certainty that

this won't happen. Everyone says "disarmament, disarmament, disarmament..." I am convinced that the Americans are not thinking about true disarmament. They realize that excessive weapons have been produced—so many weapons are not needed...To destroy 70 percent of America's industrial potential you need 500 missiles, 700 at most. And even fewer if they have multiple warheads...We should understand that we would not survive either! Even at this level war becomes senseless, because there will be no victor or vanquished. There are incomparably more weapons than this today, and consequently they must be reduced. But if we disarm unilaterally, we will be saying: "Come and get us, guys, we are lying on our backs with our legs in the air..." The Pentagon recently stated that missiles are targeted on us and they stay targeted, they won't be turned away. I have the impression that they have not changed. That they have altered the terminology a little is another matter; they use different jargon, but inside they stay the same. It is no wonder that they are offering to dismantle our nuclear weapons....

[Gubarev] And why not take this up?

[Negin] Nonprofessionals are discussing nuclear weapons! In the Ukraine they are saying: "We will construct a plant in the Chernobyl zone, first we will dismantle nuclear weapons there, and then we will reprocess waste materials." Bunkum, such nonsense! To dismantle weapons you need a machine plant, you need to turn nuts, while waste products require a chemical production unit. And they have nothing in common! When I read this, I swore, and threw the newspaper away....

[Gubarev] This most likely concerns the possession of plutonium?

[Negin] It must be safeguarded. Why can't you store it in ordinary containers [banki], for example? You would collect them all together and, if something goes awry, the whole lot of the plutonium would blow sky-high. In other words, we need special storage depots and containers. We have learned how to make them—and with complete safety. And we can even give the Americans a few tips...Now the process of disarmament has started up and such containers and storage facilities have to be made. But everything is upside down; first we bring the stuff in and collect it together, and only then do we start thinking about storing it.

[Gubarev] Can weapons be improved without tests?

[Negin] Certain hotheads seek to persuade us that they can—everything is computable. But that only applies if we repeat the past, duplicate things. But we won't create a single fundamentally new idea or make a single more reliable or safer weapon. The end of tests therefore essentially means the end of our activity.

A word or two about tests. I am convinced that they can be carried out absolutely safely. Again there have been attempts to make savings, that is to say, slightly smaller

charges at a little less depth. We have begun working "at the limit." A gas escape did take place. Incidentally, the Americans paid in the same way. The gases instantly dispersed, there was no danger, but the fact is that there was an escape. It is simply necessary to work competently! We can work without tests, we can produce blueprints and shelve them, but everyone should understand that there will be no new weapons.

Do understand me correctly. I have no objection—let us destroy nuclear weapons, completely! But let us do it together—we and the Americans.

[Gubarev] The French, the British, and the Chinese will remain.

[Negin] What I mean is that we line them all up, compare them, and eliminate them. And we leave everyone with 50 or so weapons each for the sole purpose of letting any dictator or terrorist who appears know that weapons of retribution exist. [passage omitted]

[Gubarev] Do you not think that the weapons safety threshold is now being lowered? Particularly in connection with the processes now under way in the former Union?

[Gubarev] Of course, things are at their most tranquil when munitions lie idle. At the storage depot, for example. When no one touches them or even goes near them. When they are mounted in the warheads of disabled missiles, it is as if they do not exist...But now, at a time of mass shipments, at a time when there is a huge transport accident rate, the degree of safety is naturally falling. But not to the point where you need fear nuclear explosions or the theft of weapons. Military people understand responsibility....

[Gubarev] If a weapon were stolen, could the thieves set it off?

[Negin] It is extraordinarily difficult. Although, as you know, you can do anything with a hammer—out of stupidity, of course. But this would not be a nuclear explosion, but a conventional one. However, the plutonium contained in it is dangerous. It will fragment and partially evaporate and disperse. Plutonium contamination is a catastrophe on a par with Chernobyl...Our designers are now working specifically on ways to make it altogether impossible to detonate a weapon and spread plutonium. It may be a little worse from the military's standpoint, but the main thing is that it is far safer. In general, we are considering not just "idiot-proofing," but "hammer-proofing." I consider it very fortunate that we had Khariton as our scientific leader. Yuliy Borisovich always demanded that we know ten times more than was necessary. And he always paid special attention to safety...Khariton's life, however, is a subject in its own right. He still works now without days off, sometimes until 3 o'clock in the morning, and you know, he is 88 now. True, I can't understand why he lingers now. Previously I would work until 10 at night, then till 7, and nowadays

I leave at 5 o'clock, because I see that I can finish it off tomorrow—no one has any need of all this now....[Interview ends]

...It was on that somewhat sad note that my conversation with General and Academician Yevgeniy Arkadyevich Negin ended.

I listened to the tape of our conversation several times in Moscow. I have endeavored to convey in some measure not just his points, but the inflections too. I have omitted only personal material and a few details—they are of interest only to specialists. I appreciate that there are people who disagree with Negin and who are, moreover, ready to condemn him for having devoted his talent, energy, and life to nuclear weapons. I do not want to argue with them, because it is extremely difficult to prove today that people like Negin guarantee the safety of the planet, the people, and everyone of us. But perhaps there is no need—let history have its say.

Yeltsin Plesetsk Visit, Satellite Launch Delayed

*LD2504154292 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 2100 GMT 24 Apr 92*

[Text] The planned launch of the Resurs-2 satellite has been postponed at the Russian space launch complex of Plesetsk. Space vehicles of this series film the Earth in the interests of geologists, farmers, and environmental protection specialists. According to representatives of the military command of the space launch complex the postponement of the launch of the satellite to a later date was caused by technical reasons, in particular, by the failure of one of the systems of the Soyuz carrier rocket. It has become known at the same time that Boris Yeltsin's trip here has also been postponed. His future visit is connected with overdue political decisions on making this space launch complex Russia's main space port. The technical facilities that exist here make possible the launching of not just satellites for national economy purposes from here but also manned spacecraft.

Minister Rules Out Internecine Nuclear War

*LD2104104492 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1011 GMT 21 Apr 92*

[Text] Moscow April 21 ITAR-TASS—Russian Minister for Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov ruled out the possibility of a "nuclear internecine war" breaking out on the territory of the former Soviet Union. He said in an interview with the TRUD newspaper published today: "Only twenty per cent of production facilities of our branch are located outside the borders of Russia, they are mainly mining and metallurgical enterprises. They are in no way directly related to the production of nuclear weapons." There are plans to sign agreements

with CIS member-states to maintain production potential of these enterprises, he said. "I think CIS member-states will be interested in preserving production, technological, and scientific ties. Without it no one of us can enter the Western market as partners with equal rights," the minister emphasised.

Speaking of the "brain drain" problem from the nuclear weapon complex, Viktor Mikhailov said: "No one has gone nowhere so far" and added that there exist some restrictions on travel abroad for nuclear scientists.

Recently appointed Minister Viktor Mikhailov is 58 years old. He is a specialist in theoretical physics. After graduation from the institute he was selected by Academician Andrey Sakharov for work in the secret city of Arzamas-16. Over the last few years Viktor Mikhailov directed the nuclear-weapon complex of the country.

Nazarbayev on Right To Be in 'Nuclear Club'

*LD2404101392 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 0600 GMT 24 Apr 92*

[Excerpt] President Nursultan Nazarbayev has given an interview to Basio Skvilante, a correspondent of the Italian newspaper LA STAMPA. Nazarbayev stated that Kazakhstan has the right to become a member of the nuclear club and will not hand over strategic missiles to Russia. The president of Kazakhstan justified his refusal to hand over the strategic weapons for destruction in the Russian Federation on the lack of funds on both sides which are necessary to carry out this operation.

Nevertheless, a [word indistinct] review reports that the correspondent [as heard] stated that Kazakhstan will take part in the process of disarmament and will never pose a threat to anyone. [passage omitted]

Bessmertnykh on Nuclear Tasks Facing CIS

*LD2304195392 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1810 GMT 22 Apr 92*

[Text] [First announcer] The issue of attitude to the Commonwealth of Independent States gave rise to heated debates at the Congress of the Russian People's Deputies that has just ended in Moscow.

In the long run the majority of deputies approved the creation of the Commonwealth but its further destiny depends much on whether two largest CIS republics, Russia and Ukraine, succeed in reaching agreement on a number of problems including the dispute over the Black Sea Fleet, the future of the Crimea that used to be part of Russia until it was transferred to Ukraine in 1954, and finally the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia for destruction under an international agreement on disarmament in which Russia acts as the Soviet Union's legal successor.

Up to now Ukraine has been in no hurry to remove its tactical nuclear missiles within the fixed terms and in full

scale. A Radio Moscow correspondent asked the president of the non-government foreign policy association and former Russian Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh to speak on this subject and here's what he said:

[Second announcer] The present difficult task facing the leaders of the former Soviet nuclear republics is not to succumb to temptations they are exposed to. Otherwise the problem of the Soviet nuclear weapons may become far too dangerous both for the region and the whole Europe. There is one risky point about nuclear weapons, like narcotics they develop addiction which is hard to cure in leaders as well as nations. This should be avoided.

[First announcer] Do you think the newly born nuclear states might wish to be treated as superpowers?

[Second announcer] You are quite right. Some figure the status of a country entering a new community of nations can be strengthened if it has nuclear weapons. This point of view is misleading. Attempts to gain membership in the nuclear club through such actions will arouse concern rather than respect among the world's nuclear powers. At the present time of instability and complicated problems facing the Commonwealth of Independent States there is a real danger that elements of force may emerge in

inter-relations between its members. This must not be allowed if we want to preserve the Commonwealth.

Western Pressure To Withdraw Arms Denied

*LD2204222992 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in English 2100 GMT 22 Apr 92*

[Text] A spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine, Volodymyr (?Balashov), refuted rumors which have recently appeared to the effect that our republic reviewed the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia allegedly under the pressure of foreign forces.

Volodymyr (?Balashov) declared that there has been no such pressure either on the part of Western countries or any other states.

An agreement has been recently attained on the international control over the withdrawal and scrapping of such weapons. Envisaged has been in part the presence of military experts from Ukraine on each of the sites where nuclear warheads will be eliminated, and also control over each of the numbers of weapons.

Volodymyr (?Balashov) pointed out that Ukraine is satisfied with such controls and there are no obstacles now for the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine.

FINLAND

Measures To Prevent Nuclear Technology Smuggling

LD2104185792 Helsinki Suomen Yleisradio Network
in Finnish 1500 GMT 21 Apr 92

[Text] Customs authorities are to intensify controls on goods traffic via Finland and on exports in an effort to prevent the smuggling of nuclear weapons material and weapons through Finland. Timo Krooks has been finding out about the intensified controls:

[Begin recording] [Krooks] Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, weapons and materials used for the manufacture of weapons, originating from the stores and research institutes of the Soviet Army, have appeared on world markets. Special concern is aroused by material that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Last year and at the beginning of this year Finland joined several international control systems which aim at preventing, among other things, the smuggling of missile technology and chemical and nuclear weapon materials. The National Board of Customs has now decided to intensify controls on the traffic via Finland. Customs Counsellor Kaj Blomster:

[Blomster] The focus of our controls must be switched from controlling imports to controlling exports and transit traffic, because these countries which have joined [word indistinct] follow very closely what is happening in Finland in this situation, especially on our eastern border.

[Krooks] Why must the controls on this export trade and transit goods traffic be increased just now? Has smuggling increased?

[Blomster] Well, what has happened in the east, in the areas close to us, increases concern that weapons of mass destruction will end up in hands in which we do not wish to see them.

[Krooks] Is nuclear technology or war material being transported via Finland at present? Are there any known cases?

[Blomster] No, we have not found any cases, but we are taking steps to ensure that we never do. With regard to independent regimes, to missile technology, there is no such manufacture in Finland itself, and even with regard to [words indistinct] chemical weapons, it is very slight.

[Krooks] But there are many stolen or goods of otherwise doubtful origin moving around the world?

[Blomster] We must assume that there are such goods and that they are around. [end recording]

FRANCE

Nuclear Test Moratorium Cuts Deterrence Priority

92ES0730Z Paris LE MONDE in French
10 Apr 92 p 11

[Commentary by Jacques Isnard, LE MONDE correspondent and defense specialist: "Moratorium on Nuclear Testing: Deterrence Has Lost Its Old Priority"]

[Text] France's decision to cancel the 1992 cycle of nuclear tests in Polynesia is one of a series of unilateral initiatives which tend to bolster the theory that deterrence—despite repeated governmental assurances to the contrary—no longer has the same imperative priority it has enjoyed since the early days of the Fifth Republic. Of course, the moratorium alone will not force new delays in modernization of the existing nuclear panoply, because already, owing to the uncertainties that have weighed on implementation of the most recent military programming laws, several of these projects to renovate the current arsenal have been suspended or canceled or fallen behind schedule. But the suspension of tests planned for this summer on Mururoa comes on the heels of other decisions that have a similar effect on the "updating" of deterrence.

For example, in July 1991, Mr. Francois Mitterrand chose to abandon the S-45 strategic missile, which had been designed to substitute for the S3D missiles buried in the Albion plateau. Likewise, several months later the head of state decided to "freeze" deployment of Hades prestrategic missiles, limiting the program to stockpiling 10 launchers at the Suippes Camp and ordering the dissolution, by the end of 1992, of two Pluton regiments without replacing them.

Finally, while preparing his budget for this year, Defense Minister Pierre Joxe took pains to announce that for the first time in 30 years the percentage of the military budget devoted to nuclear programs would decline.

Less Imperative

What we have then is a group of measures all of which in reality point in the same direction, namely to the fact that the international context—with the end of East-West tension and the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact—argues in favor of a restructuring of French Armed Forces that emphasizes space technology and the fielding of conventional units fewer in number but more professional and better equipped. The reduced budget percentage for nuclear forces can then be presented by the government as a French goodwill gesture in support of an East-West nuclear disarmament which to date has not accomplished as much as Washington and Moscow would like people to believe.

By the same logic, continuation of nuclear testing in the Pacific may seem less imperative. But beyond the computations, debuggings and laboratory simulations, the

need for full-scale testing is very real for a country like France, which, unlike other states participating in the global move toward nuclear proliferation, wants something more than crude weaponry. A so-called "proliferating" country is content to manufacture a few "dirty" bombs which it cannot test. Experimental detonations, however, make possible further miniaturization of the explosive charge, the safest possible ignition control system, improvements in cost-effectiveness of designs, enhancement of certain ground effects over others, adjustment of the mix of ingredients, and development of "stealth" technology to help the missile avoid premature detection.

Since February 1960, the year of the first detonation in the Sahara, France has conducted some 200 surface and underground tests, and since 1974 all tests have been underground. The sites on Mururoa and Fangataufa became operational in 1966. At the height of the testing program, there were as many as a dozen tests [per year], but from 1988 on there have been no more than six per year, and there was even talk of reducing that to four.

In 1969, General de Gaulle, who was then president, cancelled the scheduled test cycle—at the time saving taxpayers 225 million French francs [Fr]—in order to reduce government spending after the upheaval of May 1968. The 1992 moratorium would not save a significant amount of money, since day-to-day maintenance of the sites continues, and men and materiel remain immobilized there.

Manufacturers Affected

At first glance, the impact of this one-year interruption on future weapons systems appears relatively limited, owing to new delays in their scheduled appearance. Two examples will illustrate.

The new strategic Triomphant Class missile-launching submarine has itself been delayed: The first vessel in the series will not go into operation before mid-1995 armed with its current missiles (M45s)—and not before 2005 equipped with the new M5 missiles. The Rafale warplane is not expected to be operationally deployed in the Air Force—or at sea on the Charles de Gaulle [nuclear aircraft carrier]—before 1998, equipped with its current ASMP [medium-range air-to-ground] missiles.

As for the new nuclear program still in gestation—possibly a ground-to-ground missile for the Albion plateau (if that site were maintained) or an air-borne ASLP [long-range air-to-ground] (with or without cooperation from the United Kingdom)—it is not expected to see the light of day before the next century. The Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) and the Directorate of Nuclear Testing Centers (DIRCEN), which collaborate in research, development and fabrication of warheads, still have plenty of time to do their work.

While the 1992 test suspension may not have too adverse an effect on preparation of the new generation of nuclear explosives, it will probably have considerably more

impact on the defense manufacturers—airplane builders, missile builders, and electronics companies—that are responsible for the "carriers" of the weapons. The next military programming law will in effect ratify—perhaps even increase—the delays in production of the next generation of weaponry, and reduce orders to the point that between now and the end of the 1990's it is expected that 100,000 out of the 400,000 jobs in the sector will be eliminated.

GERMANY

Genscher Implicated in Iranian Arms Deals

*AU2104093392 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
20 Apr 92 pp 99-107*

[Unattributed report: "All Kinds of Goods"]

[Text] The former manager of the Flick concern, Hanns Arnt Vogels (66), enjoys the reputation among weapons dealers of never being at a loss for a trick. Above all, the former chairman of the supervisory board of the Geisenheim-based arms factory Fritz Werner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH knew the right powerful people.

The public prosecutor in Wiesbaden has been investigating his tricks for a few months. He is trying to find out why the Fritz Werner management succeeded in delivering several million marks worth of weapons to the crisis region of Iran in the 1980's. Newly discovered documents show that one of Vogels' powerful friends was useful for his weapons deals with Iran—Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Free Democratic Party of Germany).

According to officials investigating the weapons deals, Genscher not only served the formerly state-owned Fritz Werner GmbH with a good tip-off, but his ministry also supported the activities of Iranian weapons buyers in the FRG.

The documents reveal that Iranian gun buyers could even rely on the help of the Foreign Ministry while at the same time purchasing weapons from arms producers of the GDR hard currency procurer Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski for the war against Iraq.

The dubious relationship between the Foreign Ministry and Iranian weapons dealers was initiated with a letter from the chairman of the Fritz Werner supervisory board, Vogels, to Genscher.

The weapons concern got into trouble at the beginning of the 1980's. After the outbreak of the Gulf war in 1980, arms exports to Iran were no longer allowed. But Khomeyni's need for weapons was particularly great at that point.

Vogels' letter was received favorably by Genscher. The free democrat is considered a friend of Tehran's.

Minister Genscher's reply dated 10 May 1981 sounded quite harmless:

"I fully understand these problems. The Foreign Ministry is currently examining the questions that arise in this connection and which are to a certain extent linked with the current military conflict between Iran and Iraq. I hope that a solution can be found that will allow the granting of export permits for spare and wear parts, as well as for accessories and tools for old contracts. But we will have to examine all applications very carefully because of Germany's impartial position on the conflict mentioned. Please understand that permits cannot currently be issued for all applications."

But the letter contains the key hint about how to solve all delivery problems: the reference to "old contracts."

This trick was worth millions. From that point on, the managers of the Fritz Werner company supplied major equipment for producing ammunition to the Iranian Defense Industries Organization (DIO), the authority responsible for the purchases of the Iranian War Ministry.

The deliveries included everything from small-caliber plants (7.62 mm) to equipment for manufacturing shells for artillery ammunition (130-mm caliber).

In the applications, the goods were declared as "machines, tools, and materials, etc. to be used as spare parts for equipment supplied under old contracts."

The consignments were only attempts to "make possible continued operation to a certain extent," the executive secretary Karl Heinz Muth from the Economics Office pointed out. The risk of "Iranian customers turning to other suppliers because of German delivery problems" had to be avoided.

The state-owned Fritz Werner company received state approval for orders involving at least 120 million German marks [DM]. Bonn even granted more export permits for plants during the war between Iran and Iraq than the company actually supplied.

These practices were incompatible with Bonn's "principles for the export of war materiel and other military equipment." "Basically," permits are not to be granted if there is only a "danger that armed hostilities might break out." In addition, the delivery "must not contribute to increasing existing tensions."

A note by Executive Secretary Muth of October 1987 shows how well cooperation between the Foreign Ministry and the weapons concern worked—the Foreign Ministry notified the company that "Mr. Genscher will not make a decision on the applications for exports involving DM65 million before December because of current negotiations at the United Nations."

But the deal came about after all. In a letter dated 23 July 1989, the Fritz Werner office of the DIO in Tehran

stated that the last machines for producing small-caliber ammunition was handed over the previous month.

The public prosecutors who have initiated investigations against seven managers of the weapons factory suspect that the alleged old plants were in reality new projects or that extending existing capacities were involved. A number of pieces of the material seized allow this conclusion.

The head of the Iranian ammunition factories, Colonel Rahimi, for example, mentioned seven "new projects" in talks with managers of the Fritz Werner company. They included a case factory and a "line" for 7.62-caliber ammunition.

The minutes of a meeting at the DIO in Tehran dated June 1986 also suggest systematic attempts to cover up illegal deals. "It was pointed out that an export permit has only been granted for individual machines to be used as spare parts.... Colonel Rahimi expressed his willingness to formulate the order in the way we wanted him to."

The minutes also include the following passage: "A new production plant" is to be set up, and the Geisenheim-based company will "receive an inquiry concerning the procurement of spare parts."

Mysterious events within the kreis office of the Free Democratic Party of Germany [FDP] in Wiesbaden suggest the involvement of the Wiesbaden FDP in controversial deals.

Four Iranian weapons dealers appeared at the FDP office, which is located a few kilometers from the Fritz Werner company in Geisenheim, in the summer of 1986. A free democrat who was visiting the FDP office stated that "weapons deals were openly discussed in my presence."

One of the Iranians was introduced to the FDP official as the brother of an Iranian minister. The delegation did not hesitate to mention sums as well. Tehran wanted to buy "materiel for the next winter offensive" worth about DM2 billion. The manager of the FDP office was experienced in such deals—her husband worked for the Fritz Werner GmbH at the time.

The foreign minister's support for the head of the German DIO branch, Ali Modir Ghomi also requires clarification. The man resided for many years in Kaiserwerther Strasse in Duesseldorf.

The Federal Government knew and tolerated this. There, the Iranian was able to pursue his weapons deals undisturbed. As early as in November 1984, the Foreign Ministry informed authorities in Duesseldorf that Ghomi's receiving a residence permit would be appreciated.

In the letter, DIO was described as "an institution that has existed in Iran for a long time—even before the Islamic revolution—and which is responsible for the

procurement of weapons for the Defense Ministry. As a matter of fact, it deals with armament that is subject to limited export in the FRG but also with all kinds of goods."

The Foreign Ministry "supports the concern of the Iranian Embassy, because the establishment of a liaison office in Duesseldorf will have a positive effect on economic relations between Germany and Iran."

Ghomi and his colleagues in Duesseldorf were quite busy. According to findings by customs investigators, deals involving billions of marks were concluded at the DIO office within a short period. The purchase of weapons and armament was mainly involved. Ghomi himself organized everything. Thus, he also controlled the loading of the freighter Bentota at the port of Nordenham on 3 December 1984. The ship was to transport 443 tonnes of propelling charge powder to Iran—by roundabout ways naturally.

An old friend of the foreign minister frequently visited the DIO office in Duesseldorf: Sadigh Tabatabai, who established excellent links with diplomatic circles in Bonn as the weapons purchaser of the Khomeyni regime. "I contributed to paving the political way for the procurement of military equipment," the chief negotiator stated.

The Iranian with a residence in Germany used to telephone Genscher frequently about human rights issues, including the release of hostages, the modalities concerning the expulsion of Iranians who had committed criminal offenses, and other problems. Just like Vogels, Tabatabai could rely on Genscher if the situation became difficult.

Things became serious for Tabatabai in summer 1981. The diplomat in Duesseldorf had concluded an agreement with Swiss businessmen providing for the delivery of 50 U.S. M-48 tanks. The deal involved \$67 million.

Tabatabai had already transferred about \$47 million to an account with the Global bank in Duesseldorf when the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation received a tipoff. Tabatabai was to be detained because of a violation of the war materiel control law.

Genscher's authority prevented the arrest. The Foreign Ministry granted the so-called special envoy the status of a diplomat, despite the fact that he was not even accredited.

New findings in the Stasi archives show that Bonn's protege also bought equipment from the GDR. In the holy war, an alliance among businessmen was forged across the borders.

Heavy fighting between Iran and Iraq was already under way when Tabatabai appeared in East Berlin. At the International Trade Center (IHZ), he held talks with Dieter Uhlig, department head in the hard currency empire "Commercial Coordination" (KoKo) led by Stasi Colonel Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski. Above all, the

Iranians were interested in explosive material for heavy artillery and in ammunition for armor-piercing weapons.

After these talks, heavy Iran Air transport jumbo-jets landed regularly at Berlin-Schoenefeld central airport. The aircraft, which have "a transport capacity of about 100 tonnes" according to Stasi reports, were loaded with weapons and ammunition while their lighting was switched off. The supplier was the Imes Import-Export Society located at the IHZ.

In January 1989 Schalck informed Guenter Mittag, the Central Committee member responsible for the economy, that he had achieved a turnover totaling over \$500 million in weapons deals with the mullahs. The deliveries included 800,000 hand grenades; 490,000 thrower grenades; 260,000 automatic rifles; 11,048 military trucks; 11,000 tank rifles; 3,000 submachine guns; 144,000 pieces of ammunition for tank rifles; and 300 million rounds of small-caliber ammunition.

At nearly the same time that Tabatabai made his trip to East Berlin, a GDR envoy, Imes official Wolfgang Kotz, held talks with Tabatabai confidantes in Zurich on the establishment of a joint venture. They discussed the possibilities of setting it up in London, Geneva, or Liechtenstein. The enterprise was to purchase weapons in Western Europe. The GDR's share in the secret joint venture was agreed to be about 40 percent.

It is still unclear whether this company has ever been active, but it is certain that the GDR maintained excellent relations with weapons firms in the West—with the Swabian company Heckler and Koch, for example.

Officially, the mullahs never received any support. The government supplied no weapons and pursued a course of "strict neutrality" in the first Gulf war, said Helmut Schaefer, free democrat and State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry in the Bundestag.

The brothers in the East use the same legend. Despite the fact that an invoice covering the secret delivery of 30,000 122-mm-caliber shells for the BM-21 missile launcher (Katyusha) was not settled by Iran by the fall of 1989, the GDR's Deputy Foreign Minister Heinz-Dieter Winter recommended during an internal discussion that payment should not be urged officially.

An internal KoKo note dated 25 September 1989 reads that Winter "does not want an official document of the GDR government to exist in Iran which practically admits that the government of the GDR approves of this kind of deal."

The mullahs finally paid—even though with some delay. The money arrived in 1990—at the Finance Ministry in Bonn.

Magazine's Claim of Arms Sale to Iran Rejected

AU2204155592 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
RUNDSCHAU in German 22 Apr 92 p 4

[Report by Martin Winter and Richard Meng: "Genscher Did Not Give 'Tip' for Arms Sales to Iran"]

[Text] Bonn/Wiesbaden, 21 April—News magazine DER SPIEGEL's claim that Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Free Democratic Party of Germany) gave Werner Industrie-Ausruestungen GmbH "the decisive tip" for circumventing the ban on delivering military weapons and other armament material to Iran in 1981 cannot be substantiated based on the available material. In his letter dated 10 May 1981 to Hanns Arnt Vogels, Werner board of directors chairman, Genscher did indeed express the hope that a solution for exporting material from "old contracts" will be found, but Genscher did not use the term "old contracts" as a "tip," as DER SPIEGEL implies in its latest edition.

In using this term, the Bonn foreign minister reacted only to a letter from Vogels of 11 March 1981. In this letter, which consisted of four typed pages, Vogels describes his view regarding the necessity to fulfill "delivery obligations" from "old contracts from the years 1975 to 1978, which were concluded with the Iranian partners. According to the industrialist, this applied to a "number of installations, tools, and spare and working parts, as well as supplementing materials." They are necessary to maintain production in the ammunition factories, which were built by the Werner company in Iran and worth 5 billion German marks [DM].

The material, which, according to Vogels, had not yet been released for delivery by the Economic Office in Eschborn at that time, had a value of DM60,117,902: material for completing the facilities (DM5 million); spare and working parts, machine accessories and tools (about DM6 million); and "gunpowder, explosives, and fireworks material" (about DM46 million). Vogels claimed in his letter that the delivery included neither weapons nor ammunition.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Hanns Schumacher said on 21 April that the delivery of "other armament goods," including ammunition factories, was ended at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, and "new applications" were not approved. Furthermore, Schumacher pointed out that it is not the Foreign Ministry but the Economics Ministry and the Economics Office that were responsible.

The Hesse judiciary—investigating the Werner company for delivering military materiel to Iran and Iraq—does not have any evidence of any involvement by the foreign minister. Senior Public Prosecutor Wolfgang Greth said Genscher's letter to Vogels is "in the files." Vogels' letter, however, was unknown to Greth. In Greth's view, Genscher's letter is "without relevance in terms of criminal law." In his letter, the foreign minister only explained the "legal situation." Genscher drew Vogels'

attention to the fact that all applications must be examined "very thoroughly" and, in view of the war, permission is "not" possible "in all cases."

Government Tightens Nuclear Export Controls

AU2204161792 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 22 Apr 92 p 15

["K.B." report: "Bonn Tightens Export Regulations"]

[Text] Bonn—In a unilateral attempt, the Federal Government has decided to tighten export controls. The German export economy must meet additional conditions to obtain permits for delivering goods and services in the field of nuclear technology, which so far has not been subject to export permits, because they are not on the list of German exports. These conditions, published in the Federal Gazette, apply to goods, technical documents, and services with the help of which nuclear plants can be built and operated. All special regulations and measures adopted in Germany as a result of the al-Rabitah affair in Libya will be questioned with the implementation of the single European market.

The new regulation applies to plants for enriching uranium, for example. In business transactions with a group of countries, additional goods and services not mentioned in Part I, Section B of the export list for nuclear technology and documents related to nuclear technology will be subject to permission in the future. These new regulations will be added as Section 5d (technology and technical documents) and 45c (services) to the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation.

The extended duty to obtain a permit will apply to all exporters who have "knowledge" that the goods and documents will be used for nuclear facilities. A new form must be filled out in this connection. According to the new Section 5d, exporting goods and documents that are not included in the export list are subject to permission if the exporters have knowledge that the goods will be used for constructing and operating plants that might be misused for producing, modernizing, and maintaining weapons and ammunition. The duty to obtain permission applies to the sensitive states mentioned in the H list.

In a circular order, the Federal Government cited the need to reduce security risks that might be linked with nuclear plants in countries that have not adopted comprehensive international security measures or that are situated in an area of tension as the reason for extending the duty to obtain export permits. The following 12 countries will be affected by the tightened export controls: Algeria, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, Syria, and Taiwan. But there are exceptions to the tightened rules in the form of a "general permit," which applies to exporting a long list of so-called "shelf goods" [Regalwaren] that are not considered risky. Even these goods must not be exported to Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan.

In an initial reaction to the new regulations, the export economy deplored the fact that unilateral export controls once again have been imposed on German exporters. Despite exceptions for goods that are not risky, this represents a serious deterioration with new bureaucratic expenditure and additional costs. The Association for German Export Trade stated that, like the amendment to the regulations for Section 5c, the general permit for unrisky goods will reduce the volume of applications addressed to the Export Office. Granting certificates of nonobjection for certain exports has also been accelerated. But applications for exporting sensitive civilian products that might be misused for military purposes (dual use category) are still not handled fast enough. A

case was mentioned in which the application was rejected after one year. Enterprises have confirmed that despite certain improvements and simplifications concerning exporting control of civilian goods that can be used militarily, the German export economy still is being impeded in international competition by a lengthy and bureaucratic control procedure. Medium-sized enterprises have commented on the new regulations in the following way: "We no longer understand the mass of regulations and procedures." The Trade Association confirmed information from overseas markets that as a result of unpredictable export control procedures, German enterprises no longer are considered reliable partners.

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